Christianson, J R (1986) Noah, the Ark, the Flood, A Pondered Perspective, The Old Testament and The Latter-Day Saints, Sperry Symposium, 1986, Randall Books.

In short, Christianson suggests the possibility that the Lord is telling us that there are plants and animals that might be designated ‘living souls’,(‘all in whose nostrils the Lord had breathed the breath of life’). Such he suggests are eternal ‘not only in the sense that all matter is eternal’.

He contrasts this group with animals and plants that are alive only until their death on earth; which have no enduring existence beyond mortality.

The argument is that certain animals and plants were prepared by God and pronounced ‘good’ and for the ‘benefit of man’, but not others. These came forth after the fall, like thorns and annoying insects (my interpolation) which do not have the breath of life.

An interesting aside is his view on the serpent in the Garden of Eden belonging to the category ‘not of God’. Reasoning from the scriptures:

The serpent was made more subtle than any beast of the field which the Lord God made

and the condemnation,

Thou shalt be cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field which, I the Lord God, have made. (JST Gen 3:20),

he notes ‘(b)y not classifying the serpent as the most subtle of the beasts which God had made and by cursing him above those which God had made, the scripture suggests that the serpent was … something separate from those specific life forms gifted with “the breath of life”‘.
He suggests that this may have been why the serpent was allowed to tempt Eve, as in the Garden God’s creations were declared ‘good’ and would not have done so.

Christianson makes a number of other interesting observations which I have found useful: one such is the observation that the Earth as a ‘living entity’ is capable of producing a variety of life, all of which will return to the earth from which it came. Unlike those who have the breath of life, have a spirit, will be resurrected and live on.

This is a reduction of his thoughtful perspective but provides an interesting lens through which to view the natural/spiritual in relation to animals and plants.

Now back to Chomsky …

As for the natural/spiritual business, I’ll suspend any further comment until I can write up a detailed post… hopefully tomorrow.

I’ll avoid the deeper philosophical question of whether there is something that makes us into us and uniquely makes us particular – something like a Cartesian soul or a Leibnizean monad. Clearly if one pushes the role of “degree” vs. “kind” too far you’ll end up into that philosophical debate. My personal feeling is that philosophically Mormonism doesn’t demand an answer. Although both of the main popular interpretations of “intelligence” in Mormon history (say Orson Pratt’s adoption of something like a monad or B. H. Robert’s use of a Cartesian soul) end up having a unique substance that makes us into who we are. But there are clearly other alternatives. (My personal opinion is that Brigham Young rejects both of these approaches and ends up with something much more neoPlatonic in nature)

1. I think the natural/spiritual dichotomy is based upon where you intents are set. The things of this world or the things of the next. Seeing it as significantly more than that is probably wrong. One can expand this in terms of abstraction into a “what is present” vs. “what is absent” focus. (Arguably Heidegger, following Paul, does this with his authentic/inauthentic distinction we’ve discussed relative to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics) But the frequent breakdown of natural as “earthy” in the sense of origin is clearly wrong. (Look at Mosiah’s use of the dichotomy for instance where that kind of physicalist break down simply makes no sense) It’s a dualism more based upon the authors view of what’s important.

2. The idea of separating us from the animals due to our spiritual parentage is what I was thinking of. We are all sons of God in a way my dog isn’t. Yet clearly we have no idea exactly what a spirit is, what it does, or how it relates to our cognitive processes. Clearly as science progresses we find the brain and body does more and the spirit less than we thought.

My bigger point though was to suggest that even this divide isn’t as big as we think. That’s because Mormons often read the JST version of creation (Moses 2-3) to entail a spiritual pre-existence for animals. Mormons, following some common early GA quotes, also tend to ascribe there a resurrection of at least higher animals. Joseph appears to take literally the players in Revelation and thereby ascribed language to some creatures – at least in the next life. In other words while our parentage may be more powerful (given that it is God) it may not be a difference of kind (since there are other spiritual creatures). It is much more a difference of degree. (Admittedly a huge degree, but then one could argue that the difference between a Telestial human and a Celestial perfected human is a huge degree as well)

My point simply is to suggest that in the ontological plane the differences aren’t great.

3. Regarding Grammar. Some claims were made for starlings having Grammar. I think this is generally discounted. (See this discussion at my favorite blog for instance) One has to be clear what one means by grammar though. While songs can be complex and even recursive I don’t think that entails grammatical language. So far as I’ve ever heard only humans have that. The big debate is why. (And Chomsky and others have some interesting debates on the evolution of language but there is no real answer yet) Could this be a place for an unique “hook” for the necessary role of a spirit? Perhaps, although given past trends I’d be leery of making such a claim. Whenever people place spiritual phenomena as occuring in the “gaps” of our scientific understanding science tends to expand and eliminate the gaps.

4. The idea that “physical appetites” aren’t socially influenced in animals seems incorrect as well. It’s true that even among higher apes the ability to have a shared intent is difficult. However recent discoveries have show that such things do occur. (Thus, for example, tool use can be taught rather than having to be rediscovered by accident as was long thought) In terms of cognitive function this then entails that as a matter of limited degree some animals have shared physical appetites.

robf: You said the most important thing here: “Dancing With The Stars is on!”

Robert and Joe: I’m going to echo a little of what I think robf is getting at. Forgive me if I sound dismissive (it may be due to my ignorance), but I am reluctant to put any limits on animals. Every time we come up with a defining line—animals don’t use tools, animals don’t have recreational sex, animals don’t _____ —we find exceptions. And that is only taking into account extant species; the defining line would be much more elusive if we had some Homo erectus, H. neanderthalensis, etc. around to “study.”

Robert’s comments articulate pretty well what I’m getting at with the need/want distinction. A want cannot be fulfilled without its being cancelled, while a need can.

The master signifier thing is a bit complex… and I don’t think I want to hash it out tonight. It would probably be good for me to work out a post or two on all of my collective ideas on this. I’ve actually toyed with somehow coercing Adam Miller into a co-writing a paper on the idea of the anthropos psychikon in Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians (anyone have any good info on him I can use for blackmail?). I really think that this idea deserves a great deal more attention. I’ve actually written up recently a bibliography of texts that I’d like to take up in a careful, extended study of the subject: Boman’s Hebrew Versus Greek Thinking; Foucault’s Hermeneutics of the Subject; Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling; Kojeve’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel; Lacan’s Ecrits; Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization; Patocka’s Plato and Europe; Ricoeur’s Oneself As Another; and Plato’s Symposium. As you can see, I’ve really, really been obsessing over this idea, and I’d really like to think it out at further length.

At any rate… perhaps I’ll write a few follow-up posts over the Thanksgiving break (I think I’ve convinced myself not to do any school work during the break, only to work on this paper on Mormon discourse I’ve been writing and to begin doing work on a second book… am I really thinking that?).

Physical appetites or needs for animals, then, are not culturally defined like they are for humans. It is this role of others in our own self-consciousness that I think is very important in Lacan’s notion of desire. Also, though I’m not sure how directly related this is, desire—at least for Levinas—is something that cannot ever be satiated, whereas need can, at least temporarily. What I think is interesting (and I’d love to hear Joe write up his own post on this), is that I think this differentiation between need and desire is crucial in understanding our capacity to sin. But this is where I get confused: on the one hand it seems silly to think about animals as fornicating in a sinful way; but, on the other hand, it seems animals can be more or less obedient which seems something related to sin….

(#4) We are different because “mankind are children of God in a literal sense, and…animals are not”.

I’m not sure we know enough about this. Lots of speculation over the years, with several possible views. But if we accept at face value the teaching that all intelligences are eternal–including animal intelligences–then perhaps we aren’t so different from the animals. Where do animal spirits or intelligences come from? How were they “organized”? What does it even mean to be “organized”? How radical is our view of agency? How much agency do animals have compared to us?

Well, that’s enough for now…Dancing With The Stars is on!

To your specific example, this pastor probably equates ‘Darwinism’ with atheism. No God = no dignity. (Yet, who do you think has more extensive views of human dignity: people like the pastor or secular humanists?) But isn’t it theological double-speak to demand a dignified status for man based on the method of creation while subscribing (as I presume he does) to Calvinist teachings like total depravity and unconditional election?

Clark: I thought some birds have been shown to have grammer; e.g. starlings. But I don’t understand the terms defining differences in grammar to really know. But to your point: I’m very interested in what you say about creation ex nihilo, Mormonism, and intelligent design. I hadn’t thought of the relationship between them (or lack of relationship, as you point out), and I think it is a very helpful way to think about this. It really gets to the heart of the issue.

Though “carnal” can just have reference to the flesh, and though “sensual” can just have reference to the senses, these are not the only meanings of these words. That they are paired with “devilish” is of some significance: should we not interpret these words has having reference to desire, in fact to eros? The difference between man and animal is eros, desire or lack. The natural man is structured by lack, by desire, by want (animals are structured by need, not by want). This is actually closely related to the classic definition of difference between man and animal: language is key because human language is what sets lack in motion, is what regiments desire and thus makes us human. Though there are animals that communicate in one way or another, they do not speak on the grounds of a master signifier that opens up the structure of lack or desire.

It is for these reasons that Lacan is becoming more and more central to my thinking as well (you could say Freud, if you want, also): in the wake of the Fall, we are structured by lack or desire and thus give ourselves over to obsession or hysteria. The atonement is then a recasting of the human psyche by the Spirit: it is a kind of divine analysis that brings us beyond neurosis (and this is where Freud’s work can never go: analysis terminable or interminable…). Another way to same this same thing is this: the atonement is essentially a kind of typologizing of the human (all too human) psyche.

I think. I’m thinking all the time.

I am not sure that you will continue to follow this, but I am interested in these divides that Mormons reject.

A divide I would tend to construct is that mankind are children of God in a literal sense, and that animals are not. Might this be the type of divide you are talking about?

But from a Mormon view, while we see a separation between man and beast – primarily because of our spiritual heritage we also commonly attribute this to beast as well. (Many, many Mormons assume that at least “higher” animals will also be resurrected) Likewise our rejection of creation ex nihilo tends, from an ontological level, to break down the very notion of divides that one finds in traditional Christianity. (The absolute ontological difference between man and God disappears – and one could argue from non-canonical writings that the divide between man and animal with language also breaks down)

Given all this, I’ve often wondered why some Mormons feel the need to embrace intelligent design which is so based on the idea of divides that Mormons typically reject.

Also, interestingly, Alma talks about “the nature of God” in Alma 41:11, in contrast to “the nature of man.” In this sense, I would at least want to say that it is not so much “natural man” as “natural man” that is the problem—that is, it seems that since the fall we indeed have animalistic desires that much be changed, and hence made unnatural according to the order of the fall.

My point, I guess, is that it seems better to think in terms of changing our nature rather than in terms of acting unnaturally. Now, perhaps we can only change our nature by initially doing something that is unnatural to our original/fallen nature, so there isn’t really much difference. But I think the difference can, in fact, be quite important. (This relates to the issue of faith and works, as well as something I’ve been wondering about in terms of love: should we strive to love others by serving them, or should is learning to love something that will not simply come as a result of serving others? Sometimes I think our efforts to serve serve serve and do do do can undermine the development of a change-of-nature kind of loving….)

And you also make great points here. Thanks.